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INTRODUCTION: POPULAR ECONOMIES
IN SOUTH AFRICA
Elizabeth Hull and Deborah James
African economies have long been a matter of concern to anthropologists,
not least in the pages of Africa. These economies are situated, somewhat contra-
dictorily, between global settings of ﬁnancialized capitalism on the one hand and
impoverished local arenas where cash-based economic transfers predominate
on the other. The more such economies appear to be tied to wider global arenas
and operations that place them beyond the reach of ordinary people, the more
necessary it is to explore the logics and decisions that tie them inexorably to
speciﬁc everyday settings.
The articles in this volume aim to undertake such an investigation by exploring
popular, local economies in the case of South Africa: a setting which many writers
have justly regarded as ‘exceptional’ but which, at the same time, has signiﬁcant
continuities with other African contexts. The authors draw for their theoretical
inspiration on concepts developed elsewhere in Africa, speciﬁcally those relating
to the way state-regulated and legal/formal economic arrangements interpenetrate
with those less visible and less regulated (Hart 1973; Guyer 2004; Shipton 2007,
2009, 2010). We maintain that these ideas have wider analytical purchase and can
be usefully applied – even though South Africa is a setting where wage-labour
capitalism has until recently dominated the economy (Cooper 2002: 194), and
where state regulation and state-organized redistribution have predominated to a
far greater degree than elsewhere in Africa. For while unregulated economic
activities may be more limited, less multifaceted, and increasingly more subject to
the state’s gaze than in other parts of Africa, modes for analysing them are
nonetheless urgently required if we are to avoid the limitations of a singular view
of South Africa’s economy.
ANTHROPOLOGY OF ECONOMY FROM APARTHEID
TO DEMOCRACY
Although anthropologists have long been preoccupied with the relationship be-
tween the divergent structures and repertoires of global- and local-level economic
arrangements, a more nuanced anthropological study of economy in South
Africa, and one which takes account of new developments, is somewhat overdue.
In the 1970s, scholars with a Marxist orientation challenged claims that the
country’s economy was ‘dual’ (Houghton 1976) by emphasizing the articulation
of divergent economic modes. Their writings nonetheless tended to reproduce
a sense of dis-articulation. Echoing other dualisms which have prevailed in
South African studies, analyses concentrated less on productive than on repro-
ductive activities and focused mainly on the rural subsistence economy. Although
it was the intention to challenge liberal economists’ model of a ‘dual economy’
(ibid.), anthropologists nonetheless implicitly accepted a division of academic
labour, continuing to explore subsistence and redistribution, and leaving matters
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of the market and the creation and exchange of value to economists. This was
an economic arena linked to the mainstream only through the activities of
participants in the (stunted) ‘informal economy’ or through the mechanism
of migrants’ remittances. Such remittances, dubbed ‘private redistribution’ by
Seekings and Nattrass (2005), were increasingly supplanted by their ‘public’
counterparts: particularly the state pension, upon which poorer people came to
rely as unemployment rates soared after the late 1970s.
But the sphere previously seen in structural terms as concerned with ‘repro-
duction’ has been revalidated as a legitimate concern of those anthropologists
interested in economy. Before Adam Smith coined the phrase ‘political economy’,
the household was the original domain in which economy was seen as situated:
there is now a call for a return to a ‘human economy’ perspective (Hann and Hart
2011; Hart et al. 2010). ‘Community’ needs to be explored alongside ‘market’,
claims Stephen Gudeman, and local, ‘house’-based models of the economy must
be acknowledged as relating to, rather than being distinct from, more corporate
conceptions (2001; 2010: 139). Here, too, the value of Jane Guyer’s book
Marginal Gains (2004) can be seen. She calls for a transcending of binary assump-
tions in which capitalism on the one hand is counterposed against local forms
of exchange which resist it on the other. Instead she calls for attention to how
economic concepts emerge from ‘experience in the world’ (2004: 158). She asks us
to explore how dynamic processes of formalization are extended ‘piecemeal’
rather than uniformly and in a homogenizing manner (ibid.: 157). Formalization
and informalization thus occur in continual interaction with each other, pro-
ducing a plurality. Such processes are of course particularly important in Atlantic
Africa with its relatively undeveloped character. But we argue that South African
economic activities, despite being more recognizably tied to full-blown capital-
ism, can beneﬁt from a similar analysis. There are, however, important
qualiﬁcations, of which more later.
In settings where ideologies and practices of neo-liberalism have been starkly
juxtaposed with or imposed upon earlier forms of economy, whether these are
corporate-capitalist or household-based in character, it is thus a matter of urgency
to understand how these domains intersect. Using the insights of scholars like
Guyer, Gudeman and Hart, we aim on the one hand to incorporate existing
anthropological concerns with the household, but on the other to develop modes
of analysis that transcend ‘dual’ or ‘articulation’models. We examine how people
invest, safeguard or redistribute their wealth and how economic behaviour at an
individual level helps either to form or destabilize social relations and social
reproduction. In a context of increasing ﬁnancialization, including attempts by
the state and the banking sector to incorporate more and more people within
mainstream ﬁnancial structures, we also explore money making, both formal and
informal, beyond the household. Income inequalities and consumption practices
are areas of intense media coverage and the focus of a range of popular associ-
ations and assumptions in the shaping of South Africa’s public moral discourse.
Have attempts at creating a single economic framework, and incorporating
the marginal and previously politically disenfranchised, changed the character of
investment and property ownership, bringing attendant problems of risk and
indebtedness? How far have individuals or groups been empowered to engage in
entrepreneurial activities, in the context of the new limitations or opportunities
presented by wider economic shifts? How have these processes interacted with
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citizens’ expectations and contributed to the shaping of identities, in a setting
where state welfarism (owing much to South Africa’s past) coexists with new, and
more classically neo-liberal, ideas of enterprise, economic independence and
privatization?
SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY: THE BIG PICTURE
South Africa’s democratic transition in 1994 coincided with attempts by the newly
elected African National Congress (ANC) to establish a vibrant economy aimed
at enticing foreign investment. Combining the economic priority of growth with
the political one of democracy confronted the new government with sometimes
irreconcilable objectives: to ensure a healthy economy attractive to private
investors while retaining popular support (G. Hart 2002: 61; Adam et al. 1998:
190). In recent years, however, this task has become increasingly difﬁcult, with
unemployment and poverty proving persistent scars on the social landscape.
Making the task still more challenging, recent analyses speak of the widening gap
between this impoverished ‘underclass’ and the privileged ‘liberation aristocracy’:
a new cadre of black business-oriented elites, assisted by policies of Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE), whose interests are closely entwined with those
of the ruling ANC (Freund 2010: 21). Occupying an insecure middle ground is an
upwardly mobile group – a new middle class (Krige 2011) –which since early
2007 has suffered record levels of house and car repossessions. As part of an
attempt to bring all investors, consumers, savers and spenders within the ambit of
a single economy, to regulate the activities of loan sharks and to make ﬁnancial
markets ‘work for’ the poor and the newly enfranchised, government and non-
proﬁt organizations such as the DfID-funded Finmark Trust have undertaken
initiatives to institutionalize ﬁnancial arrangements that were previously per-
sonalized, and to establish a single standard of value for monetary transactions.
The articles in this special issue examine the often unpredictable outcomes of
these measures and the economic activities that take place in response to, or
despite, them, in the form of daily strategies used by different groups to generate,
exchange, save and convert income. The authors explore people’s responses to
a range of state-imposed conditions, in a context that is shifting increasingly
towards private investment as an overarching dogma, looking at activities that
fall both within the regulatory mechanisms of the state and outside of them, and
at the ways in which the two are linked.
Many of the changes in the South African economy since the 1980s have
corresponded to wider global shifts. A process of ﬁnancialization occurring
globally, linked to the economic priorities laid out in the Washington Consensus,
has profoundly reshaped the relationship between society, state and market. The
process is characterized by an increasing dominance of ﬁnancial markets and
services as a proportion of national economies, and a corresponding decline in
labour-intensive industrial growth. This trend has been replicated in South Africa
where, in the early 2000s, acquisition of ﬁnancial assets rose considerably, and
the government focused its investments on the capital-intensive Mineral-
Energy Complex (MEC) rather than on the dwindling manufacturing sectors.
The only exception was the automobiles and components industries which
continue to enjoy high levels of state subsidies and tax reduction measures
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(Marais 2011: 130–2). In addition, rather than relying on foreign debt, the govern-
ment entrusted the reduction of its balance of payments deﬁcit to capital income
generated through ﬁnancial markets. According to Marais, this policy has been at
least as expensive as international debt would have been, and considerably more
volatile (ibid.: 132). It is this expansion via the ﬁnance sector, in the absence of
investment in manufacturing and production, which underlies the economy’s
jobless growth observed by commentators over the last decade.
In an attempt to engender a more stable and attractive environment for
investors, the government has attempted to bring diverse economic activities into
the formal structures of the economy, for example, by encouraging those without
bank accounts to begin storing their money in banks. The claim is that the poor
will stand to beneﬁt from greater ﬁnancial literacy and economic interaction in
formal systems of money exchange and saving mechanisms. Indeed – so the argu-
ment goes – it was the lack of exposure to credit and other formal banking services
under the stunted apartheid system which accounts for the apparent ﬁnancial
ineptitude of a majority of South Africa’s black population today. An alternative
viewpoint might concede, however, that the failure of the banking system to cater
to a large proportion of the population in the ﬁrst decade of liberal democracy
had to do with private interests. These interests have shifted recently, partly
because since around 2004 the ‘easy market’ that banks initially targeted after
1994 for the offer of credit and other ﬁnancial services, consisting of South
Africa’s formally employed, became saturated. This over-supply of such services
to established markets, especially those which serviced the white middle class,
has driven capital to move into markets that were previously regarded as ‘too
risky’ and ‘too insecure’. In search of proﬁts, banks and lending agencies have
increasingly also pushed their way down the socio-economic ladder into poorer,
riskier, ‘gap markets’, where local populations have not had a history of formal
banking and have not historically used formal sector ﬁnancial products. In some
sectors, like housing, the state has also compelled formal ﬁnancial institutions to
provide products for the poor (such as in the Financial Charter in the housing
sector). These products provided by formal banks provide lines of credit to the
black middle and working classes, and even to welfare dependants. Porteous and
Hazelhurst make the point candidly: ‘now that the demand for the formally em-
ployed has been all but saturated, the focus cannot but move to the informally
employed’ (2004: 89; for a similar process in Ghana see Breckenridge 2010:
649–50, 655).
This process is contradictory, however, for while the increasing reach of regu-
lation is extended to this previously elusive proportion of the population –whose
activities were viewed as occupying an ‘informal’ realm beyond the purview of
the state – the ﬁnancialization of the global economy at large, whereby the move-
ments of capital have been largely freed from state regulation, indicates wide-
spread informalization. This has taken place under the watch of structural
adjustment policies demanding increased ﬁscal control and the withdrawal of
governments from ‘interference’ in markets, an economic orthodoxy that has
operated since the 1980s. As Keith Hart puts it: ‘to the extent that neo-liberalism
has succeeded in reducing state controls, the world economy itself has become
largely an informal zone’ (Hart 2010: 152). In this sense, as Hart argues, it is more
meaningful to speak of the ‘partial institutionalization of economies’, rather than
of speciﬁc groups of people occupying a distinct ‘informal sector’ (ibid.: 150). So,
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for example, there has been a proliferation of ﬁnancial products created in South
Africa’s townships themselves, through local initiatives and schemes which
supplement or run parallel to the credit and ﬁnancial services offered through the
formal banks. Beyond these, the importance of Hart’s argument is to debunk the
idea that ‘informality’ can be applied exclusively to the peripheral, the unem-
ployed or those in sequestered or racialized spaces. On the contrary, it proliferates
at the core of the global ﬁnancial system, and at the heart of apparently ‘main-
stream’ capitalist ventures in some of the peripheries of that system. In South
Africa, for example, the large Aurora goldmine was purchased by elites from the
Zuma and Mandela families with their BEE (Black Economic Empowerment)
partners. In an enterprise situated at the very core of the Mineral-Energy
Complex, workers were left unpaid, staying in unmanaged compounds, living off
scraps and later beginning to engage in informal, artisanal mining. Informality,
in this and other cases, is neither a throwback to some earlier pre-capitalist past,
nor an accidental fallout from a dominant structure, but is the result of intentional
retractions of government regulation.
The global credit crunch that began in 2008, and the domino effect of national
recessions that followed it, profoundly disrupted any notion that the ﬁnancial
systems governing international capital regimes are stable and coherent. Activities
that received heightened media attention in the months following, such as com-
pany tax avoidance, off-shore banking and ﬁnancial speculation, are instances
of the global economic informalization to which Hart refers. Furthermore,
following the global economic crisis, there are fewer plausible avenues for con-
cealing this fact. Recent political lobbying by banks against state regulation has
been exposed. An article in the Guardian newspaper reports that during theWorld
Economic Forum of January 2011, banks complained about ‘undue punishment’
in the form of the threat of regulatory reform. The chief executive of international
investment bank JP Morgan is reported to have ‘snapped . . . that banks were not
prepared to simply “bend over and accept it” from regulators’.1 While pressure is
placed on developing economies to create suitable climates for investors by for-
malizing and monitoring economic transactions, as in South Africa, governments
have conceded to the pressure of private capital to allow its free, unregulated
movement.
Given the decision to open the economy to promote foreign investment, South
Africa has been described as ‘one of the largest and most deregulated [economies]
within the emerging markets’ (Economist Intelligence Unit, quoted in Marais
2011: 132). In South Africa, one of the outcomes of deregulation was the excessive
lending of credit to consumers during the 1990s. As in America and Britain, the
economic growth of the South African economy during this period and into the
early 2000s was fuelled by an unsustainable credit boom, leading to increasing
levels of indebtedness. Porteous and Hazelhurst sum up the relationship between
private capital and the government during this period, saying that ‘private
interests drove very rapid expansion in access to credit; and the state spent much
of the remainder of the decade trying to limit the fall-out’ (2004: 85). Thus some
measures were put in place – albeit largely in hindsight – to curb the rapacious
1‘Davos summit leaves David Cameron and George Osborne feeling bruised’, The Guardian,
29 January 2011.
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credit extension practices of the 1990s: notably, the National Credit Act of 2007.
Some commentators argue that the worst effects of the crisis in South Africa were
avoided due to the introduction of these regulations, providing banks with some
degree of protection from external pressures.2 Figures suggest, however, that the
negative impact of global recession has been considerable (Marais 2011: 145–7).
As unemployment increased in South Africa, it became increasingly clear, and
impossible for the government to deny, that South Africa’s fortuitous period of
growth had drawn to a swift close: an acknowledgement that accompanied
growing anxiety and economic insecurity among many South Africans.
In his State of the Nation address early in 2010, President Jacob Zuma
acknowledged the soaring unemployment rates in South Africa and linked these
to the global crisis. By doing so, however, he also implicitly diverted attention
from a much deeper historical trajectory of systemic unemployment that ﬁnds its
roots in the apartheid policies of labour market intervention in the 1970s and that,
in fact, has deepened since the inception of liberal democracy in 1994 (Seekings
and Nattrass 2005). The measures that he declared would help to reverse the
effects of the recession were mostly under way already, namely supporting the
motor industry and MEC. This is one instance in which a particular view of
history is conveyed in order to shift the moral terrain of political debate in the
present. Other instances hinge on attempts to emphasize a radical break with the
apartheid past. The articles in this special issue examine the historical trajectories
that have been forged in South Africa’s public moral discourse, either inten-
tionally or implicitly, and how these shape particular understandings of the
present or how they reveal or conceal, in particular, features of social and
economic relationships that often arise out of more complex developments over
time.
What are these historical trajectories, and in what way are continuities with the
present in evidence? An important legacy of the pre-1994 era is the considerable
extent of state spending. Despite the much-criticized shift from an initially
redistributive to a more growth-oriented policy in the wake of the second
democratic elections, South Africa has been characterized as a ‘distributional
regime’ given the mediation of these effects by state spending (Seekings and
Nattrass 2005). Although its expenditure on grants and welfare – at under 4 per
cent of GDP – is small in comparison to the Nordic countries, South Africa’s state
spending is generous by developing country standards: it distributes millions
of rand each year in the form of grants and pensions. While thus possessing
some of the character of post-socialist Europe’s ‘millennial capitalism’, it has been
distinguished, both during and since apartheid, by such spending and by the
accompanying sense of citizen insistence – and dependency – upon this (Bähre
2011). Liberal trade and self-enrichment combine with government intervention
in often unexpected ways: a fact acknowledged by Ferguson, who points out that
such rises in social spending – in South Africa as in Brazil – have much to do with
the ‘contingencies of democratic politics’ (2009: 171; 2007).
2Miles Donohoe, ‘What the credit crunch means for South Africa’, Trade Invest South Africa
website, 22 October 2008, <http://www.tradeinvestsa.co.za/feature_articles/843629.htm>, ac-
cessed 3 August 2011.
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A second legacy concerns the way in which state regulation during apartheid
limited entrepreneurial activities by Africans, especially small-scale ones arising
out of the ‘informal sector’. Their stultiﬁcation was inevitable in racially segre-
gated areas where state planning was pervasive, where few Africans were granted
trading licences, and where Indian shop owners beneﬁted both from restrictions
on African business and from the racial legislation which prevented penetration
by white businessmen (Hart and Padayachee 2000; Krige 2011; Kuper 1965: 76,
261–89; Seekings and Nattrass 2005: 142). Although some merchants have
proﬁted from the lifting of these restrictions and transformed their approach
to business, many commentators suggest that the uneven or dualistic legacy of
apartheid remains. The articles consider what opportunities do exist, however,
and in what ways these make use of, or are limited by, particular social and
economic arrangements in which the imprint of past inequalities may be evident.
They explore ethnographically the contradictory character of a society in which
strong state intervention dovetails, and is increasingly required in order to keep
the economy in alignment, with a neo-liberal market orientation.
POPULAR ECONOMIES
The period between 2008 and 2010 was a judicious moment to explore existing
and emerging economic arrangements, given the challenges – both economic
and ideological – brought to the fore by the global ﬁnancial crisis. While
acknowledging that a notion like ‘informality’ remains crucial in order to enable
us to capture non-regulated spheres of activity, we treat with caution the formal/
informal dichotomy, given the necessarily state-centric focus that gives rise to
such a dualism (Roitman 1990). As Keith Hart – to whom the term is originally
credited – points out, the concept of informality posits such activities negatively
vis-à-vis the formal sphere. It ‘acknowledges a world outside the bureaucracy, but
endows it with no positive identity’ (Hart 2001: 156). Several anthropologists and
historians began to take up the challenge of describing economic behaviour in
a more detailed way, resulting in the emergence of a literature that embraced
the idea of ‘multiple livelihoods’ as a key deﬁning characterization, referring to
the combination of formal employment with other types of income generation
including farming, petty trade, remittances and, in South Africa, government
grants (Francis 2000; Murray 2002). These contributions to the debate about
informality challenged the erroneous labelling of individuals according to
separate categories of ‘employed’, ‘unemployed’, ‘farmer’, ‘worker’ and so on.
They also conveyed the diversity of various practices in which different groups
engaged.
However, others have criticized the view emerging from some of the livelihoods
literature that ‘ﬂexibility and improvisation should be celebrated’ (Francis
2000: 21). The positive slant given to informal activities, they argue, obscures
the fact that they are generated out of necessity and the need for survival, in a
political and social context that is structurally skewed to their disadvantage
(ibid.; Marais 2011: 221). Celebrating the ingenuity of informal activities risks
fuelling ‘neo-liberal’ dogma that embraces ideas of ‘vibrant civil society’,
‘entrepreneurialism’ and ‘self-help’, implicitly endorsing the withdrawal of state
responsibility for citizens’ welfare and suppressing more radical claims to state-led
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redistribution (ibid.: 223).3 In similar vein, Ferguson notes the extent to which
even NGO ofﬁcers deploy arguments suggesting that the informal economy and
high unemployment are here to stay, thus removing an important aspect of social
democratic arguments that remain committed to the idea of social change, pro-
gress and equality (2007). Indeed, the rhetoric surrounding the ‘second economy’,
a term popularized by the former Mbeki government in plain ignorance of the
extensive historical debate which questions the validity of the ‘dual economy’
concept, has fuelled this positive twist on informality, which has come to be seen
as a potential untapped resource to be brought under more rigorous control and
utilized as a poverty-reduction tool.
What is particular about informality in the South African context has to do
with the extent and depth of capitalist development and accumulation which, over
the course of the twentieth century, exceeded its equivalent in any other part of
the African continent. Land and resources were widely and effectively brought
under the ownership of a white minority. Under apartheid, the expulsion of
Africans to rural ‘homelands’ undermined and often eradicated the possibility
of rural families eking out a living through farming, while heavy reliance on
urban industry through the remittances of migrant workers was indicative of an
economy increasingly driven by wage labour. This process of incorporation into a
dominant capitalist system has been more pervasive than in other parts of the
continent. As Frederick Cooper writes: ‘Wage-labor capitalism, in most of Africa,
takes place on islands in a sea of other sorts of socio-economic relations; in
South Africa, wage-labor capitalism pervades the economy’ (2002: 194). Given
the (former) ubiquity of wage-labour capitalism, unemployment has become a
focus of intense public anxiety, and represents the social crisis of an historic shift
from a situation of labour demand (that characterized the rapid industrialization
of South Africa) to that of widespread labour over-supply. It remains the case
that the main routes to enrichment are through formal, public-sector or private
employment, despite an ideological shift in recent years to acknowledging,
celebrating and attempting to encourage the ‘entrepreneurialism’ of those striving
to generate cash in the interstices of this dominant system. This historical legacy,
then, has underpinned the incentive to further standardize economic behaviour,
providing dominant assumptions about the nature of accumulation which render
informal types of work either problematic or structurally invisible. Alternatively,
as mentioned above, it renders such work subject to inclusion in a policy discourse
about the ‘second economy’.
The analytical separation of the formal from the informal can be challenged,
not only on the grounds that they are interlinked economically as Hart, Guyer,
and others have shown, but because it relies on a notion of state governance and
bureaucratic form as distinct and contained, rather than as a blurred and disputed
terrain: ‘everyday forms of state power . . . are always suffused with and mediated
by politics: contestation of authority, open deﬁance, as well as attempts to divert
or privatize resources’ (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 9). While exploring
areas that are often below the radar of the state and of capitalist enterprise, we
3This argument echoes earlier neo-Marxist critique of the ‘informality’ concept, for example
Portes and Walton 1981.
8 ELIZABETH HULL AND DEBORAH JAMES
aim to escape from such binaries and policy discourses by favouring the term
‘popular economies’. This recognizes the legacy, in South Africa, of earlier studies
of popular culture which described a world of new identities and activities located
in the city, where people had newly come into contact. Everyday survival
strategies of the poor such as beer brewing and other economic activities were
analysed, as well as forms of popular resistance, ritual and the like (Edwards
1989; La Hausse 1988). What made this domain ‘popular’ was its hybrid
character, its inventiveness and creativity, and the way it relied on particularly
inventive ‘brokers’ – even crooks and tricksters – for its operation (Barber 1987;
La Hausse 1993; James 2011). The term thus stresses the embeddedness of
economic practices and institutions in broader cultural milieux; their reliance on
ideas about luck, fortune, fate and the like; and the way they speak to dreams of
wealth, equality, and the future. The articles in this volume both analyse the new
ways in which popular economies mesh with regulated and partially regulated
zones of economic exchange, and how economic transactions are implicated in
processes of political articulation or discontent, and in the shaping of new and
emergent identities.
A recent literature, addressing such cultural perspectives in particular, stresses
the quasi-magical manner in which economic transactions may be experienced.
The illusory and intangible aspects are foregrounded, with the proliferation
of covert and transient ﬂows of money, via such shadowy practices as offshore
banking, ﬁnancial speculation and a host of risk-taking activities including
gambling, pyramid and insurance schemes, seen as engendering a sense of vulner-
ability and mystiﬁcation about value exchange, expressed through a correspond-
ing explosion of witchcraft and ‘occult economies’ (Comaroff and Comaroff
1999; 2000; cf. Shaw 1997; Geschiere 1999). While not denying the relevance of
such insights, we ﬁnd Guyer’s (2004) and Shipton’s (2007, 2010) work useful in
helping to shift attention away from the mystiﬁcatory, even ‘occult’, nature of
money, exchange and economies, and towards a focus on their pragmatic and
experience-based aspects.
The ongoing debate regarding the embeddedness vs abstraction of money is
addressed by Guyer, who shows that money converts social value and hierarchy,
whilst also pegging that value vis-à-vis other values. This approach gives rise to
an emphasis on money transfers and conversions as involving a plurality of
formalizations, and offers an escape from the simple dualism of informal/formal,
or from an idea that one must move inexorably towards the other (2004).
Similarly instructive is Parker Shipton’s recent trilogy of books on the general
topic of ‘entrustment’ (2007, 2009, 2010). He neither sees economic matters as
separate from other aspects of life, nor, contrarily, emphasizes the need to
‘embed’ them in social matters. Instead, he gives an account of lending, mort-
gaging, debt and credit in the social world of the Luo, by widening the ﬁeld to
include obligations between generations, paybacks between the living and the
dead, and a broad range of scenarios not normally thought of in connection with
exchange or ‘money’ in the strictest sense. In his account, Luo, while duty-bound
to sustain and respect whatever responsibilities they may incur towards others, are
depicted as having some freedom to opt for – or to choose against –more or less
formally ﬁnancially framed versions of these obligations. One gains the im-
pression from these authors that, in West and East Africa, exchanges and
conversions between monetary and non-monetary values do not mystify people.
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Rather, they both broadly obey local logics and involve some degree of choice on
the part of individual actors.
It is here that our articles indicate some divergence in South Africa from these
insights into plural (in)formalizations or forms of entrustment in other parts of
Africa. Proletarianization and incorporation as consumers into the world of
corporate capitalism occurred in South Africa more comprehensively, and much
earlier, than in other African countries, even though such processes were uneven
in character. In addition, the virtually monopolistic penetration of particular
brands – furniture, foodstuffs, soap powders, toothpaste, beer – into the racially
separated zones of the township was achieved relatively swiftly, resulting in an
extremely monolithic consumer culture which extended throughout the country
and was remarkably similar whether in township or rural village. Additional
pressures with the advent of rapid upward mobility since democratization in 1994
have exacerbated this brand penetration while adding new, more up-market
names and products. Competition between neighbours has driven many deep into
debt. Alongside this, a vast redistributive system of grants and pensions staves off
the worst extremes of poverty visible elsewhere on the continent, also reinforcing
the pervasiveness of the state-regulated economy. The drive towards economic
‘informalization’ which such forms of capital penetration paradoxically prompt is
often less a matter of choice, and more a matter of necessity, than it appears to be
in some of the other African settings described above.
The South African picture bears a closer resemblance, then, to the situation
described by Kate Meagher in Nigeria, in which a swift process of economic
formalization, intended to close the gap between the ‘ﬁrst’ and ‘second’ econ-
omies by way of a rapid implementation of extensive business regulations, has
had the opposite effect, pushing more people and businesses into covert and
informal practices even while greater dependence on a formal economy has meant
fewer income-generating alternatives, especially in comparison to other countries
in which cash economies are more encompassing (Meagher 2010, especially
Chapter 4). In her study, as in ours, these structural frameworks do not entirely
determine economic action, and there remains of course some freedom to engage
in transactions of the kind that only an ‘actor-centred perspective’ can illuminate
(Long 2001). But these structures and the historical trajectories that underpin
them also play some role in undermining the kind of trust that might make for
more concerted, community-oriented responses to the domineering forces of
capitalism ‘from above’ (Bähre 2007). While such structures and histories have
certainly underpinned the creation of new ‘enterprise cultures’ from below, they
also play a role in inhibiting the full development of these, in line with earlier
apartheid-era trajectories. In short, they create a setting where choice is limited,
and where monolithic trends seem to compel forms of social and economic action
rather than leaving these wide open to individual ingenuity.
RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS
All but one of the researchers whose work is presented here were participants in a
project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC); the
remaining one, Maxim Bolt, conducted doctoral research under a separate rubric,
but also funded by the ESRC. Paying careful attention to the continued existence
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of racially spatialized settings, the project effectively restricted itself to African
areas of the kind explored in previous anthropological studies, although also
exploring the movement of the occupants of such areas into new spaces. It com-
prised a range of studies in different but linked geographical/socio-political
contexts. The researchers, having previously worked in their ﬁeldsites – often
multiple ones – on earlier projects, had extensive knowledge of them which they
brought to bear on the new investigation. Their existing experience fed into the
formulation of research questions about popular economy. The answering of
these questions required, in some cases, that interview data be privileged over
participant observation; and that multi-sited examples predominate over a more
thorough knowledge of one particular locale. Nevertheless, researchers’ existing
knowledge of these settings allowed them to circumvent – if not entirely ade-
quately deal with – questions of representativity, and of the validity of inference.
Rather than using case studies to serve merely as ‘apt illustrations’, ethnographic
vignettes and examples were, in the manner of the Manchester school, located in a
wider context ‘which in turn impose[s] constraints on the actions of the
protagonists in the case study’ (Evens and Handelman 2006: 27). Attending to
this ‘wider context’, researchers moved beyond speciﬁc locales to direct attention
to policy discourses and the pronouncements of agents within the state, the
corporate sector, and the world of charitable and non-governmental organiz-
ations. Whether in relation to gambling in the lottery, to problems of indebted-
ness, or to scandals about the unwarranted awarding of ‘tenders’ to political allies
or cronies, South African life is extensively commented upon and discussed by
political actors and activists, and matters are widely reported in the press. During
ethnographic research, attention to this wider set of discussions formed an
important backdrop to the case study material. Also underpinning this attention
to policy questions and commentary, and evident particularly in the articles by
Hull, Neves and du Toit, James, and van Wyk, was the ESRC’s requirement that
researchers be seen to have ‘impact’ within the wider, non-academic community.
Aspects of the arguments in these articles were developed in preparation for
presentation to the banking, journalist, insurance and business community at a
‘dissemination workshop’ in Johannesburg, in September 2010, and some of
the articles are explicitly concerned to provide refutation of, or at least nuance
to, state- or market-driven ideologies: for example, about problem gambling
(van Wyk), the horrors of debt (James), the irrationality of investing in pyramid
schemes (Krige), and other matters.
Six researchers worked in city settings (Bähre; James; Krige; Neves and
du Toit; van Wyk), three in former homeland areas (Hull; James; McNeill), and
one on a white farm on the South Africa/Zimbabwe border (Bolt). Two studies
cross-cut rural/urban polarities, with James investigating the interrelations
between a rural periphery – in the province of Mpumalanga – of the metropolitan
hub of Gauteng/Johannesburg, while Neves and du Toit explored two closely
related settings in the rural Eastern Cape and the metropolitan Western Cape.
Indebtedness in the post-democracy era is the focus of Deborah James’s article.
Debt is incurred not just through proﬂigacy but for long-term investment,
especially in higher education, but exhaustion of formal credit channels prompts
civil servant borrowers to turn to loansharks, themselves state employees. Social
embeddedness, she shows, thus exacerbates middle-class overindebtedness,
impedes upward mobility, and can be conducive to ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour.
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Livelihoods beyond state employ and/or moneylending are restricted by dual
economy legacies. Consumers intensify reliance on funeral and savings clubs.
Expanding beyond ‘saving’, and responding creatively to the perceived predations
of formal credit providers, these clubs lend out money at interest but are, in turn,
vulnerable to borrowers’ non-repayment. Complex ﬂows of money, and patterns
of exchange and indebtedness, defy the static labelling of individuals as either
‘borrowers’ or ‘lenders’. Contrary to common conceptions of indebtedness as a
sign of irresponsible spending or lack of ﬁnancial aptitude, becoming indebted is
in fact difﬁcult to avoid, not least for those whose strategies for wealth ac-
cumulation aspire beyond levels of mere survival. As anthropologist Polly Hill
showed during her research in the 1960s on the rural Hausa of Nigeria (1972),
indebtedness is not experienced by the poorest people who cannot afford to
borrow, but by those with some possibility of economic advancement. Indeed,
James argues, it is difﬁcult to be upwardly mobile without getting into debt. She
criticizes many of the assumptions that inform popular understandings of
economic behaviour, and that undergird policies aimed at standardizing informal
activities. One of these is the idea that, with improved education, people will
behave in a more ‘rational’ way and will more easily access the beneﬁts of formal
ﬁnancial arrangements. People are becoming indebted not because they lack
education but rather because they are willing to pay for the privileges that edu-
cation endows: and because it is the best or only ﬁnancial option. The apparent
lack of political outrage around issues of indebtedness and house repossessions
has to do with a moral discomfort associated with being in debt, that leads to it
being suppressed or hidden from the public eye. As people negotiate their
indebtedness, then, they also negotiate wider questions of identity and their social
relationships with others, in a moral economy fuelled partly, but not only, by a
desire for material gain.
Similarly challenging the media-fuelled speculation that poor South Africans
behave in irresponsible or ‘irrational’ ways because they lack the ﬁnancial know-
how to make better decisions is Ilana van Wyk’s article. Writing about practices
of, and attitudes towards, gambling, she argues that gambling is often seen as a
type of work alongside other limited income opportunities. With James, she
points out that the ‘culture of immediate gratiﬁcation’ – blamed for fuelling a
proliferation in gambling in South Africa – is not an immature and opportunistic
response of black people to the freedoms bestowed upon them by liberal
democracy. Rather, the pursuit of status through material and ﬁnancial gain has a
longue durée in South Africa, as earlier anthropological literature on the rise of
the African bourgeoisie demonstrates (for example, Kuper 1965; Brandel-Syrier
1978). Despite the consensus in public moral discourse (and in high economic
theory for that matter) that gambling is a foolishly risky pursuit unlikely to yield
reward, van Wyk appeals for a more contextual understanding of risk. In an
environment characterized by generalized economic insecurity, gambling cannot
be singled out as separate from other income streams, which are also highly
unreliable and precarious. Thus, for the Cape Town residents interviewed by van
Wyk, many other forms of potential income generation ﬁtted equally, or even
more aptly, into the category of ‘taking a chance’.
Also engaging with the moral economy of gambling, extended to include
pyramid schemes and insurance services, both formal and informal, is the article
by Detlev Krige. Such forms of risk taking, he argues, have become popular in the
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context of unfulﬁlled expectations, increasing disparities in wealth, and a long
history of class aspiration that took shape under colonial and apartheid govern-
ments. With van Wyk, he rejects the assumption that participants in these
activities lack sufﬁcient knowledge, restraint or rationalizing capabilities, arguing
that the popularity of such schemes is rooted in a broader trend of ﬁnancialization
in the South African economy, and mirrors the risk taking and speculation
characterizing the higher echelons of global ﬁnance. Through the lens of
three South African women, all serial participants in such schemes, Krige
describes the complex and often contradictory motivations and explanations that
accompany these activities, and that express fundamental tensions at the heart of
South Africa’s moral economy between ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘imminent doom’,
risk taking and predictability, entrepreneurship and greed. The irreconcilable
nature of these tensions is conveyed through the ‘bewildering’ array of
such volatile ﬁnancial activities that are the product, not the antithesis, of
ﬁnancialization.
One activity through which people in South Africa’s formerly sequestered and
racialized spaces have long sought to make a living is informal music production.
Fraser McNeill describes a struggle faced by musicians between musical self-
expression and economic need, in a context in which avenues for generating
income – the formal music industry and tender-driven performance at govern-
ment shows – place implicit restrictions on politically subversive lyrics. His article
tells the story of how Colbert Mukwevho, renowned reggae artist from the former
homeland of Venda whose passion for reggae had a politicizing inﬂuence during
his formative years growing up in apartheid South Africa, learnt to temper his
lyrics during the 1980s for fear of retribution under an oppressive apartheid
system of censorship. Yet even after the end of apartheid, his third album,
Doomsday – a more open critique of post-apartheid governance –was rejected by
the CCP record label on the grounds that it was ‘a threat to national unity’.
Today, performances at government shows are the only way for informal
musicians to earn a reasonable income; but most have learnt that to do so they
must avoid songs with political content. Musicians are thus compelled to sacriﬁce
‘artistic freedom’ for the sake of ‘economic gain’. Musical content thus undergoes
‘regulation’, despite occupying an informal space. With James, Krige and
van Wyk, then, McNeill demonstrates continuity with apartheid era norms.
In this instance, the government evades the formalized political principles of
democracy – it can no longer simply ban songs as did the apartheid regime – by
covert manipulation of economic relations via the partially informalized system
of tenders. The moral onus, furthermore, is transferred to the musicians
themselves who undergo a process of self-censorship while engaging in ongoing
struggles to maintain professional and creative integrity alongside economic
survival.
The interconnections between formal and informal economies are explored by
Maxim Bolt. His study was conducted on a farm in northern Limpopo, situated
directly adjacent to the border fence that separates South Africa from its neigh-
bour Zimbabwe. Many of the farm’s employees are Zimbabwean immigrants.
Bolt begins with a critique of existing literature on border politics, arguing that
the emphasis on the distinction between legal and illegal (encouraged by the
dominance of state presence in border areas) obfuscates other distinctions in
income-generating practices – such as that between formal employment on the
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farm and informal activities –which are more central to understanding economic
dynamics in the area. Exaggerating the signiﬁcance of the border in physical
terms, he argues, also risks drowning out other ‘spatial logics’: the position of the
farm far from town, for example, is signiﬁcant in inﬂuencing the informal
economic activities of its employees. Far from being a desirable end-point, he
argues, formal employment is often merely a strategy that assists the establish-
ment of individual businesses. The two mesh together in interesting ways. For
example, the particular ‘wage rhythms’ of the farm enable a system of credit to
develop in relation to the informal supply of goods. In addition, it is the time
ﬂexibility of informal retail, in contrast to the ﬁxed opening hours of the com-
pound shop, that enables its successful operation. Informal commerce capitalizes
on the rigidity of formal structures, thriving off these while maximizing its own
competitive niche of ﬂexible work hours. Hence, Bolt argues, although the
temporal and spatial arrangements of formal structures place limitations on
informal income creation, they may also be translated into opportunities.
Where Bolt explores these matters in one particular setting, David Neves and
Andries du Toit offer a comparative view of several case studies drawn from
different contexts. They emphasize the plural and uneven nature of informalities,
and challenge the assumed centrality of the state, arguing that such activities
typically fall under ‘overlapping, concentric rings of authority and governance’.
These include, in addition to government regulation, chieﬂy systems of authority
and locally deﬁned rules – the ‘social imperatives’ – of particular areas or groups.
A local ‘taxi van’ association is one example: while non-statutory, it demands
paid membership from drivers in that particular locale. One implication is that
‘the state is far from assured a monopoly of violence’. Yet the picture is diverse.
In another example Neves and du Toit show how formal structures can block off
informal opportunities for income creation. A new Japanese minibus taxi,
introduced through a government recapitalization programme, reduces the remit
of work provided by untrained mechanics because of the specialist electronic
equipment it requires. As Neves and du Toit reveal, in this instance ‘the
exclusionary potential of formality inheres in a combination of both regulatory
change and technological “lock out”’.
An expanding area of ‘formal’ economic activity, both in the sense of making a
living and of keeping insecurity at bay, is that of insurance. Erik Bähre’s article
discusses insurance companies’ use of brokers as a mechanism for gaining access
to an otherwise impenetrable market of the non-formally employed. Brokers are
expected to make use of their own social networks in order to recruit clients and
generate investment. Far from representing a distinct sphere in contrast to the
‘socially embedded’ world of informality, the formal sector actually makes use of
existing social relations and networks to extend its reach beyond the typical remit.
This provides an interesting comparison with Bolt’s article, in which the emphasis
is on the way that informal actors make use of formal systems; here, the opposite
is the case. It is also an interesting counterpoint to Neves and du Toit’s example of
Japanese taxis, where formal regulations shut down other possibilities. In con-
trast, registered insurance companies depend upon the social networks that are
most often associated with informal enterprise. The article draws attention to the
idea of the invisibility of the formal sector, which is an important inversion of
the state-centric perspective in which informality is positioned beyond the gaze of
the state, and hence is invisible. This was conveyed in the example of Shumikazi,
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who decided not to tell her clients she had switched to working for an insurance
company, a decision that became problematic when the company raised its
monthly fee, which required her to pass on the extra cost to them. The idea of
invisibility is also conveyed in Bähre’s description of opaque bureaucratic
procedures, the complexities and intentional inconsistencies of which render it
extremely difﬁcult to make insurance claims.
The theme of visibility is addressed by Elizabeth Hull, who argues that the
aesthetics of ‘formality’ are appealing and sought-after. Using the example of a
microﬁnance initiative in rural KwaZulu-Natal, Hull shows how members’
expectations of the bank are formed in response to the history of their own partial
and intermittent experiences of local development initiatives, loaning schemes,
government institutions and personal ﬁnancial strategies. Arguing that formality
is experienced and viewed by the bank’s members as a set of material, aesthetic,
technological and bureaucratic qualities, Hull explains that members desired and
expected the community bank to acquire the same signiﬁers. The ongoing
creation of the bank as a credible institution was challenged by this comparison as
well as by existing mistrust in such initiatives, and the delay that members
experienced while waiting, indeﬁnitely, for credit. Hull demonstrates that the
search for formality is not inconsequential, but concretely inﬂuences the ﬁnancial
practices of members. The degree of formality perceived to have been acquired by
the microﬁnance bank inﬂuenced their decision to invest in it or not –which,
ultimately, was to affect their ability to access loans. The article illustrates that
delay and waiting are ubiquitous experiences in such contexts, and focuses the
lens on the economic activities and moral narratives that emerge in the interim. In
contrast to Bolt’s article in which formality is less desirable than informal
practices of money making, Hull found that formality was a sought-after value
and an index of citizen expectations, a form of consumption that shapes identities
in the creation of what Achille Mbembe referred to as a ‘performance of
worldliness’ (2004: 374).
In sum, the articles in this volume demonstrate that formalities are uneven; and
that their coexistence with informalities often intensiﬁes as poorer and wealthier
people attempt to develop redistributive networks. Whatever shape is taken by
entrepreneurial activity, it often relies on wages, as with farm workers (Bolt) or on
state- or non-state regulatory processes, as with petty traders and artisans (Neves
and du Toit). Alternatively, or in addition, it may depend on the notorious
‘government tender’ system, which then becomes the economic basis of an entire
industry and its proﬁts, as with reggae musicians (McNeill). However, trust in
regulated activities may exist for primarily affective reasons, as with community
bank members who valued the aesthetic and bureaucratic qualities characteristic
of high-street banks, without which investors were put off and their ability to
access loans affected (Hull).
Citizen action, such as strikes by trade unions or service delivery protests,
involves demands for wage hikes or improved government performance, but tends
to omit all mention of indebtedness. Substituting for collective campaigns, and
because of consumer reluctance to ‘share experiences’, the individualized advice
offered by NGOs turns ‘citizen’ into ‘consumer’ rights (James).
Risk taking, and consumer pursuit of status through material gain and formal
credit-agency avoidance, originate in dual economy legacies, with their unfulﬁlled
expectations, wealth disparities and frustrated class aspiration. Gambling is not
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about ‘immediate gratiﬁcation’ but is seen as a type of ‘work’ alongside other
limited and precarious income opportunities (van Wyk), and participants in
pyramid schemes have ideologies combining ‘progress’ with ‘imminent doom’,
entrepreneurship with greed: contradictory attitudes reﬂective of ﬁnancialization
in the broader world (Krige).
Overall, economic inequality is on the increase, causing risk aversion to com-
bine unevenly with enterprise. Unregulated burial societies proliferate, encour-
aging investment to hedge against such risk; formal insurance offers greater
security while providing employment for local brokers/salespeople (Bähre), but
‘reinsurance’ arrangements often fail.
People of divergent status or class backgrounds all seek to access largesse from
the state using informal or innovative means. South Africa thus has neither a
‘neo-liberal’ nor ‘redistributive’ regime; rather, neo-liberal means interweave with
and facilitate redistributive ends.
CONCLUSION
A reader of the South African newspapers could be forgiven for constructing a
somewhat monolithic narrative. Neo-liberal change has seen members of the new
middle class become increasingly individualized, compete ﬁercely with each other,
and conﬁne their passions to the purchase of consumer items in a kind of mad
potlatch, while those further down the ladder struggle simply to stay alive, relying
largely on state handouts in order to do so. Everything seems to be ‘for sale’ in a
setting where civil society is on the wane, replaced by churches that promote a
new prosperity gospel for yuppies while offering some solace to the poor. While
for the very few these upward trajectories may be enabled by ﬁnancial formality,
many others are blocked, with the promise of a prosperous lifestyle receding ever
further into the distance.
An alternative account, prompted by the insights of writers such as Shipton
and Guyer, mitigates this by pointing to the social embeddedness of mon-
etary exchange, the existence of local logics of transaction and the availability
of choice – albeit a restricted choice, given both the strongly state-governed
and resolutely market-oriented character of post-transition South African
society – about how and where to convert between registers. Local logics of
conversion and investment drive people to rank monetized exchanges against
moral/personal transactions both within and beyond households, weighing them
up against each other. Petty entrepreneurs can eat their stock and, conversely, use
family labour to help their trade. Women, separated from their husbands and
opting to reconnect to their natal families, can be torn between securing their
‘customary obligations’ to these kinsmen, and involvement in seemingly for-
malized ﬁnancial arrangements such as mortgages. Upwardly mobile people
striving to manage ﬁnancialized products can be doubly entangled with off-
the-radar moneylenders. The few who have well-paid or salaried positions
experience intensifying obligations and responsibilities: they may be expected to
help educate siblings’ children, while simultaneously strategizing to remain
beyond the obligations of marriage and the reach of prospective in-laws.
The articles in this volume show how these apparently divergent narratives of
individualized excess and moral obligation intertwine, in complex and unexpected
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ways, for people caught between what modernity promises on the one hand and
the disruptive realities it delivers on the other.
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